Th is study investigates the eff ects of pay vis-à-vis elements of the ethics infrastructure that contribute to eff ective administrative control; and to unethical practices in the Nigerian public service. Based on critical analysis of primary offi cial and secondary data, the study reveals that corruption and fi nancial impropriety are far more common and intense among higher public offi cials who, incidentally, are better remunerated, than among the lower cadre offi cials, who are poorly remunerated. Th e study shows that despite the emphasis on the compliance or sanction approach to administrative ethics rather than the virtue approach, there is still wide incongruence between the ethical approach adopted and the expected results. Th is is because of the existence of a weak political and administrative control system at the higher administrative functions. Th e study suggests that reducing unethical practices should aim at improving openness and transparency at the high level through more citizen involvement and civil society action, reviewing the criminal justice system to ensure severe punishment that can serve the purpose of deterrence and prevention, speedy dispatch of corruption cases and strengthening of oversight linkages between the public institutions and ethics coordinating institutions.
Introduction
Employees' remuneration, or pay, is a major variable for evaluating their organizational behaviour. Since the time of Frederick Taylor and the scientifi c managers, the consideration of pay as a motivation for employee performance has generally attracted support in the literature. Financial rewards have the capacity to maintain and motivate individuals towards higher performance (Dobre, 2013) . On the other hand, it can also fail to boost productivity and improve performance signifi cantly (Whitley, 2002) . Th ese dual characteristics of pay as a motivator can also be extended to the examination of issues of unethical fi nancial practices such as fraud, bribe taking and other self-enriching practices of public offi cials. Th e question can be asked as to whether employee pay or remuneration determines the level of unethical fi nancial practices in a public service system. Scholars like Rose-Ackerman (1999) have posited that if public sector pay is very low, corruption tends to be a survival strategy. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) show that relative high wages of public servants are associated with lower corruption. Similarly, Dmochowski, Jurczuk and Szczepankowski (n.d.) aver that public service conditions, may be more or less conducive to ethical behavior by public servants. Th us, low pay in the public sector may be blamed for the prevalence of corruption and other unethical practices especially in low-income countries. Adedokun (2016) avers that any country intent on seriously fi ghting corruption must pay public servants fair and realistic wages benchmarked to private sector earnings.
While the above observations cannot be ignored, it appears, however that this cannot be a unilateral and one dimensional relationship as in the case of pay and motivation. Low pay does not constitute a necessary and suffi cient condition for unethical fi nancial behaviour of public offi cials. A number of other components have been found to equally determine the ethical behaviour of workers. Th e Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has, since 1996, evolved the notion of ethics infrastructure. Th e ethics infrastructure is a range of tools and processes to regulate undesirable behaviour and to provide incentives for good conduct among workers. Following surveys and analyses of approaches adopted by member countries on how public servants can be given support in observing the highest standards of integrity and ethics in the public sector environment, the OECD Public Management Committee (PUMA) underscored eight vital elements that constitute a holistic and comprehensive strategy in determining factors infl uencing ethical behaviour in the public service of OECD countries. A cursory look at the components of the OECD ethics infrastructure reveals that these are also measures applied by other countries in an eff ort to deal with issues of ethics and corruption. Th ey include: political commitment, eff ective legal framework, effi cient accountability mechanisms and workable codes of conduct, professional socialization mechanisms (including training), supportive public service conditions, existence of a central ethics coordinating body and an active civil society able to act as a watchdog over the actions of offi cials.
Th e divergence in the ethical statuses of countries apparently depends on the degree of effi ciency and eff ectiveness in institutionalizing the ethics infrastructure. Th e OECD survey (1996) also reveals that countries embark on some permutations in establishing the ethics infrastructure. Invariably, countries pay more attention to some of the elements in relation to their ethics climate (Stare & Klun, 2016) . It is in this vein that this study seeks to evaluate the relative importance of the elements in determining the level of ethical success or failure in the Nigerian public service system. Th e questions that the research seeks to answer include: what factors promote unethical practices in the Nigerian public service? How does the component of pay contrast with administrative control measures in relation to the low and high level public offi cials in this challenge? Specifi cally, the study investigates and compares the level of pay among the higher and lower cadre public offi cials as well as the eff ectiveness and comprehensiveness of administrative control at the two levels. Findings show that poor administrative control plays a more signifi cant role in supporting unethical behaviour in the Nigerian public service than pay. Th e study therefore suggests that reducing unethical practices should aim at ensuring that the topmost layers of the public organisations are eff ectively checked and controlled.
Th e Nature of Administrative Ethics
Th e importance of ethical consideration in politics or as a social phenomenon dates back to the time of Greek philosophers who were concerned with life in the polis -the Greek city states. Some of the notable Greek Philosophers like Plato and Aristotle regarded ethics as a part of politics, the main function of which was to provide the conditions under which the members of the human community, the polity, would be able to achieve lasting happiness (Makrydemetres, 2002) . Th e central discussion about politics was the question of virtue or vice, goodness or badness, and rightness or wrongness of human actions. Primarily, ethics is a branch of philosophy that tries to logically establish the basis or standard for human action, whether as applicable to oneself or to the society. Th us, ethics can basically be distinguished into personal and social ethics; personal ethics being applicable to the individual person while social ethics concerns itself with groups (Lynch & Lynch, 2006) . Th e intrinsic connection between the two aspects lies in the fact that social actions are carried out by individuals. Th us, no matter how we perceive countries, societies, groups or their organisations and institutions as legal personalities, their actions are ultimately reducible to that of individuals or at least a collection of individuals. Th is therefore raises the question of fi duciary and moral responsibility on the individual, about how his actions should benefi t or disadvantage the society. Th is of course has not obfuscated the fact that ethics is also about the good life of the individual, which may or may not synchronize with the 'social' goal. Life is personal and the good life could be evaluated using diff erent and oft en contradicting standards. Hence, ethics as a concept is "open to confl icting interpretations' (Martinez, 2008, p. 15) . While it may be objectively determined using some agreed universally valued standards such as "honesty, respect for others, trustworthiness" (Denhardt, n.d.), for some, it could as well be subjective and relative.
Th e challenge of setting a framework for ethical standard is less complicated for social ethics to which administrative ethics could be classifi ed, because it is usual to assume certain common goals of a social group than it is to defi ne what the good life is for individuals. In other words, for group or social ethics such as administrative ethics, it is easier to defi ne standards in terms of law, codes, customs and traditions or even guides, rules and regulations. Social ethics embraces a set of norms, assessments and opinions, which are characteristic of a group of people. It points to society, citizens, groups of people as creators of norms and standards of behavior (Dmochowski, Jurczuk & Szczepankowski, n.d.) . Th is is why Martinez (2008, p. 15 ) sees law as a concept developed by governments to ensure that citizens engage in 'right conduct' . For him, "the western legal system is grounded on public rules, known and knowable beforehand, governing the manner in which persons within a regime act in conducting public transactions. "
It is not just the western legal system but legalisms in every form (natural, social, organizational) which have the objective of determining the basis for right conduct of a group. For this reason, we fi nd that the ethical standards that apply to social positions (e.g. public offi cials, doctors, lawyers, military personnel, and clergy) refl ect the roles and relationships common to that position (Denhardt, n.d.). As a social concern therefore, ethics can be considered as a disposition to act right or wrongly in line with the wishes and benefi ts of a society. It is in this sense that one can talk of standards of professional conduct or standards of religious conduct, standards of medical practice, standards of the scholarship professional practices, standards of administrative practice, and standards of Christian or Muslim behaviour (Asobie, 2001 ). Social ethics demands that subscribing to membership of a group or accessing a position necessitates that one should subject oneself to the ethical codes of such group, in spite of his or her own personal ethical standards. Th is does not justify the adequacy or correctness of social ethical standards understood in terms of law in comparison to individual moral standards. But social, group or organizational life demands compromises of values one holds dear. Social ethical standard requires one to "work within the system as far as basic decency will allow" (Rohr, 1989, p. 11) . Where the basic decency is not allowed, the individual reserves that moral right of resignation in protest or resignation on grounds of conscience (Weisband & Frank, 1975) rather than violate the law.
Th e point here is that there are two broad conceptual traditions in administrative ethics -the moralist and the instrumentalist traditions. Th e moralist school tends toward institutional reform, through law and other regulatory mechanisms, while the instrumentalist is more likely to focus on design and enhancement of problem-solving capacities (O'Kelly & Dubnik, 2012). UNDP (2007) describes the approaches required by these traditions to maintain ethical public service as compliance-based and integrity-based ethics management approaches. Anello (2006, p. 3) sees them as strategies towards eff ective ethics administration in the public service. Using unethical behaviour of corruption as example, he avers:
Eff orts to address the issue of corruption in the public sector have focused on the application of two basic strategies. One strategy has been a legislative reform approach, which establishes laws against corruption with appropriate punitive consequences for violations. Th is approach is oft en referred to as the "discipline approach", which attempts to deter corrupt practices through the fear of punishment. Th e second strategy, oft en termed the "values approach", attempts to increase institutional integrity by promoting moral values and ethical principles as a way of motivating public servants to behave ethically.
Th e discipline approach is compliance-based and focuses on strict compliance with descriptive administrative procedures, control mechanisms and detailed rules which defi ne what public servants should avoid, what they should do, and how they should do it. Th e value approach, which is discussed also as the virtue ethics in literature (Frankena, 1973; Cooper, 1987) , on the other hand entails promoting moral values and ethical principles and making the public offi cials imbibe them as personal ethical values. It is integrity-based and "encourages good behaviour rather than policing and punishing errors and wrongdoing" (OECD, 2000, p. 25). According to Cooper (1987, p. 321) , it concerns "'predispositions' or 'inclinations, ' traditionally called virtues, which move an administrator to act upon principle, even in the face of anticipated resistance or punishment. " Unlike the discipline approach, the virtue approach lacks clear defi nition of what should be standard behaviour. It involves cognitive activity.
An important issue about the two aspects of administrative ethics discussed above is whether countries should pay more attention to either. Debate on the preeminence of both is not very pronounced in literature. However, a number of scholars, for example, Anello, (2006), UNDP (2007) and Demmke and Moilanen, (2011) have implicitly accorded relative importance to the virtue approach. Anello (2006) agrees that the two approaches cannot be used in isolation. He therefore gives equal importance to the two strategies and argues that neither is suffi cient if used alone, but coordinated use of both or a mixed approach is required to have a signifi cant impact on establishing ethical practices within an institution. Underscoring the importance of the two strategies also, Demmke and Moilanen (2011, p. 7) consider that the virtue approach is more comprehensive in covering all areas of human actions, arguing that:
Ethical laws, principles and standards do not cover all areas of human actions, nor do they always help in dealing with ethical dilemmas and personal confl icts. Th is also suggests that ethically good or acceptable behaviour can be defi ned not only by focusing on obedience to rules but encompasses also such issues like justice and fairness, leadership, ethical culture and the broader social context of behaviour. Cooper (1987, p. 323 ) supports this position by positing that virtuous conduct does not amount to merely conditioned refl ect behaviour as would law; it is not just unthinking habitual response to stimuli; even though the term 'habit' is sometimes used to characterize virtues, one might say that reason is employed in addressing particular situations, but with a certain pre-established attitude and a conditioned will (Cooper, 1987, p. 323) . Rohr (1989) tends to support this view, since for him, administrative discretion is the foundation of administrative ethics. Hence, an offi cial requires a habitual sense of justice and virtue to interpret the mind of law. Nevertheless, Rohr also believes that a government employee should 'work within the system' (obey the law) even at occasional risk to his soul. He therefore believes that the most important ethical infrastructure for the public offi cial or the bureaucrat on whom his work is restrictively focused is the formal, legal or institutional controls. But to the extent that these "are either non-existent or ineff ective, bureaucrats have the ethical obligation to respond to the values of the people in whose name they govern. Th e values in question are not popular whims of the moment, but rather constitutional or regime values. Th is is because the bureaucrat has taken an oath to uphold the Constitution" (Rohr, 1989, pp. 4-5) . Rohr perceives that "all forms of organizational life demand compromises of values one holds dear. Th e person who is unwilling to 'risk his soul occasionally like the rest of us' cannot contribute constructively to any organization" (Rohr, 1989, p. 10) .
For some scholars, it is the ethical environment or climate that should determine which of the approaches should command more importance. Th e compliancebased approach seems more appropriate to situations in which unethical behaviour is rampant and will be diffi cult to change, while the integrity-based approach appears more appropriate to situations in which there is a strong shared sense of values, and a higher degree of homogeneity (UNDP, 2007). Ethical climate can be defi ned as the perception of what constitutes right behaviour and thus becomes a psychological mechanism through which ethical issues are managed (Martin & Cullen 2006, p. 177) . In a weak ethical environment such as Nigeria, stealing government resources for instance appears to be heroic. People only aspire to government positions to get rich and indeed one will be considered foolish and stupid by his people to remain poor aft er holding an exalted public offi ce. In this kind of environment, it is obvious that the political will and even the psychological disposition of offi cials to do what is universally acceptable as ethical may not be achieved through the value approach or poor attitude to formal, legal or institutional controls. In such an environment where unethical behaviour has reached a crisis, where people tend to retain positions despite obvious ethical scandals, and where corrupt individuals are celebrated and honoured, there is little doubt that fi nding ways to strengthen the disciplinary approach to administrative ethics will be the way to go. Working to change such a permissive ethical climate will likely be more successful by enacting and enforcing codes of ethics, policies, and directives that specify, discourage, monitor, and correct unethical behavior. In this vein, the disciplinary approach should not be seen only in the mere establishment of what constitutes administrative ethics (law, rules and regulations, codes), but in the manner of enforcement of sanctions against bad conduct. It entails eff ective administrative control, transparency and accountability in governance. Laws and ethical codes without committed enforcement 'lacks teeth' (Geuras & Garofalo, 2011 , p. 5) as a measure to fi ght unethical behaviour.
Th e Nature of Ethics Infrastructure
Scholars and institutions concerned with administrative ethics have expanded the two strategies to administrative ethics to showcase specifi c elements usually referred to as ethics infrastructure, which countries have employed to pursue ethics in their public service. Th e Public Management Committee (PUMA) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2000) has, through a 1999 survey, identifi ed important elements that OECD countries generally use to promote integrity and prevent unethical conduct in the public service. Th e elements constitute a framework that has popularly been referred to as ethics infrastructure. While the framework was specifi cally used by PUMA to provide comparative information about OECD countries, there is a close-fi t of the framework to what other countries use in their concern to maintain well-functioning institutions and systems for promoting ethics in their public service. Th ese elements are encapsulated in the table below. 
OECD Ethics Infrastructure

Political commitment:
Governmental policies and programmes that do not receive support from the highest political and administrative levels will likely fail. In the absence of sustained political commitment to ethical behaviour in the administration, eff orts to encourage such behaviour will be in vain
Workable codes of conduct:
Codes of conduct play a vital role in stating the expected standards of behaviour
Professional socialisation mechanisms:
Socialisation mechanisms are the processes by which public servants learn and adopt ethical norms, standards of conduct, and public service values. Training (induction and ongoing) is an essential element to raise ethics awareness and develop skills capable of solving ethical dilemmas; good role models (especially managers) also serve this purpose. Th e content of the codes of conduct or even legal provisions remains simply words on paper, if it is not adequately communicated and inculcated
Ethics coordinating body:
Th ese take various forms -parliamentary committees, central agencies, or specially created bodies -and assume various functions: "general promoter" of public sector ethics. Th e existence of a coordinating body should not be construed as absolving departments and managers of the responsibility for ensuring ethical conduct within their jurisdictions
Supportive public service conditions:
Th e high standards of ethical conduct expected of public offi cials are one side of the coin. Th e other side is a "package" which provides decent working and living conditions for the "servants of the public". Th is "package" consists of such basic elements as suffi cient job security, opportunities for promotion and career development, fair remuneration or social appreciation. Fair and impartial human resources management policies can ensure that selection and promotion processes in the public sector are based on general professional requirements and non-discrimination, and that other factors, such as, for example, political considerations, are minimised. If public servants are feeling underpaid, overworked and insecure, then they are less likely to embrace initiatives to improve performance including in the ethical domain
Eff ective legal framework:
Th e legal framework is the "teeth" of the overall ethics infrastructure. Laws and regulations defi ne the basic standards of behaviour for public servants and enforce them through systems of investigation and prosecution. In reviewing its legal framework, a country must check that existing criminal codes and civil service laws, confl ict of interest statutes and other regulations which apply to public servants are clear and consistent
Effi cient accountability mechanisms:
Accountability mechanisms should encourage ethical behaviour by making unethical activities hard to commit and easy to detect. Accountability mechanisms set guidelines for government activities, for checking that results have been achieved, and for checking that due process has been observed. Th ey include internal administrative procedures (requirements that activities or requests be recorded in writing), comprehensive processes such as audits and evaluations of an agency's performance, or new forms of procedures such as whistle-blowing (which can encourage public servants to expose wrongdoing committed by others or to say no when asked to do something inappropriate). Th ey might also be external to the public service: for example, oversight mechanisms such as legislative or parliamentary committees
Active civil society:
Ethics is everybody's responsibility, including that of an assertive media, which through its probing reporting helps citizens to act as watchdog over the actions of public offi cials. Freedom of information laws guarantee citizen access to public information from the late 1960s and they can institutionalize and support public awareness and responsiveness It is not generally agreed how to classify these elements in relation to the discipline and virtue approaches. Anello (2006) provides a slightly diff erent ethics infrastructure whose components are: -A framework of moral values and ethical principles -A code of conduct -A programme for the socialization of an ethical framework and code of conduct -Established anti-corruption legislation -Established administrative procedures -Mechanisms for whistle-blowing (ombudsman) -Sanctions on reprehensible acts -Mechanisms for collaboration between existing anti-corruption agencies -Management, coordination and evaluation of an ethical infrastructure These find corresponding elements in the OECD ethics infrastructure above. Anello (2006) classifies the first three components of his ethics infrastructure as based on the values approach and the remaining six on the disciplinary approach.
In our inclination to argue that the disciplinary approach should be more eff ective in a permissive ethical environment, coupled with the factor that Nigeria attempts to legislate every possible features of the infrastructure as we shall see briefl y, we consider seven of the OECD ethics infrastructure as relevant for the disciplinary strategy. Only the element of supportive public service conditions is used here as the virtue approach whereby good pay for public offi cials is perceived as helping to reduce moral culpability. Th is element is explained in (OECD, 2000, pp. 24-25) thus:
The high standards of ethical conduct expected of public officials are one side of the coin. Th e other side is a "package" which provides decent working and living conditions for the "servants of the public". This "package" consists of such basic elements as suffi cient job security, opportunities for promotion and career development, fair remuneration or social appreciation. Fair and impartial human resources management policies can ensure that selection and promotion processes in the public sector are based on general professional requirements and non-discrimination, and that other factors, such as, for example, political considerations, are minimised. If public servants are feeling underpaid, over-worked and insecure, then they are less likely to embrace initiatives to improve performance including the ethical domain.
In this study, all the features of this element are operationalized in terms of relative pay of the higher and lower offi cials. For further clarifi cation, higher public offi cials are understood here as political offi cials that oversee the public institutions and the higher career offi cials of the directorate rank. Th ese are offi cials that head units, sections, departments or an entire Ministry, Department or Agency (MDA). Th e rest of the rank and fi le in public organizations are considered lower offi cials.
Th e OECD (2000) makes another classifi cation of the ethics infrastructure that is also very apt. It employs a three functional classification of Guidance, Management and Control to underscore the expected role of each element of the ethics infrastructure in promoting administrative ethics. Th is classifi cation not only takes care of the legalistic/sanction and value/incentive roles suggested by Anello (2006) , but additionally underscores the critical relevance of organizational roles such as leadership and management in providing the necessary coordination required for ethics in public service. Guidance is provided by strong commitment from political leadership; statements of values such as codes of conduct; and professional socialisation activities such as education and training. Management can be realised through co-ordination by a special body or an existing central management agency, and through public service conditions, management policies and practices. Control is assured primarily through a legal framework enabling independent investigation and prosecution; eff ective accountability and control mechanisms; transparency, public involvement and scrutiny (OECD, 2000, p. 23) .
Apparently, where leadership and management are morally weak, control will obviously be weak as well. Provision of incentives and sanctions in themselves are not suffi cient to engender ethical behaviour without eff orts to guide, lead and control public offi cials. Control is not just the issue of having laws and sanctions, codes of behaviour and so on, but the commitment to enforce these in the interest of the public trust. It is argued that no amount of sanctions existing in a public service system can ensure eff ective ethical behaviour where the drive does not originate from the leadership. Th is is why a former Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Edward Hennessey, declared that ethics must begin at the top of an organisation. It is a leadership issue and the chief executive must set an example (Butts and Rich, 2008) . Indeed, leadership unites the two aspects of administrative ethics since it is the leader that should be responsible for the enforcement of sanctions and compliance-based ethical systems as well as motivate subordinates to ethical behaviour through values approach. Butts and Rich (2008, pp. 141-142) aver that:
Substantively, leaders can use their power in a positive way to infl uence people through role modeling… thus using a virtue ethics approach…. Structurally, ethical leadership involves a strategic planning process so that policies, decision-making processes, consultation, accountability and ethical standards, and ongoing assessment and monitoring are in place to ensure ethical practice by the leader and followers. Ethical leadership has a structural component and a substantive character component. In all, administrative ethics are effective through a process of laws and sanctions, as well as incentive and support system that improve the moral will and rationality of employees to act rightly in the face of an ethical dilemma. The challenge to administrative ethics in most countries including Nigeria is therefore not in the absence of sanctions or incentives but in the commitment and subjection of leadership and management to administrative control, enforcement of sanctions and role modeling. The clear divergence in ethical status of countries is determined by the attention paid to the components of existing ethics infrastructure rather than how beautifully the codes sound.
Ethical Role of Pay Structure in the Nigerian Public Service
There exists wide salary disparity between the political and career officials in the Nigerian public service in favour of the political officials. The remuneration of political officials in Nigeria has always been couched in secrecy. Indeed, at some point, political leaders unilaterally fixed their salaries themselves. For instance, after the birth of the Second Republic in 1979, the first duty performed by the National Assembly was to fix their salary and allowances which was so high that it irked the Nigerian Labour Congress to demand a salary increase (Adejokun, n.d.). Though the 1999 constitution has assigned the duty of fixing the remuneration of public officials to the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC), nothing seems to have changed about the arbitrariness and impunity with which this is done. RMAFC believes in fixing reasonable packages for political officials in a bid to discourage stealing and minimize incidences of corruption in public offices (Ibid.). But it is surprising why this principle does not also count regarding fixing the salaries of career employees.
What is baffling is that Nigerian political officials are known to be among the highest paid in the world in spite of the fact that the country is one of the poorest in the world. In his analysis of the Nigerian Export-Import Bank Economic Confidential Report, Adejokun (n.d.) observes that political office holders in the executive and legislature, including judicial officers totaling 1,268 with the federal government earn a combined pay of NGN173.6 billion. While 4,418 individuals functioning in the same category in the 36 states earned a combined NGN360.091 billion, and 11,788 officers in the 774 local governments earned NGN592.8 billion. Th e above fi gures add up to NGN1.126 trillion as pay for 17,474 political offi ce holders in country of 175 million people with a total budget of about NGN5 trillion. As a matter of fact, the Remuneration Act of 2008 pegs the annual salary of a Senator at NGN8.2 million, and a Member of the House of Representatives at NGN4.2 million. Th is is generally believed not to be exclusive. Other allowances have been estimated to be tenfold of the salary. Allowances and the perks of offi ce usually account far more than the salary (Daily Trust, 2015).
In the face of this gross abuse, the minimum wage for an average Nigerian civil servant is NGN18,000 for the federal civil servant, and signifi cantly less for the states and local government' employees. Eff orts to improve the remuneration of public servants over the years usually face enormous challenges including infl ation and low fi nancial capacity of the government. ) recommendations led to the introduction of the monetization policy. Th e policy had sought to establish some coherence in the wide disparity in salaries and allowances among various groups in the public service. Th rough the reforms, a total of thirteen categories of salary structures were recognised through the various stages of implementation of the monetization policy. Th e table below shows the minimum and maximum emoluments and their compression ratios for various cadres of consolidated salary structures in the federal service. From the above table, it can be observed that enormous pay disparity still exists not only among the lowest and highest paid offi cials, but also among the various consolidated pay categories in the service. Nevertheless, one clear fact is that the salary of those who are supposed to oversee and control the administrative hierarchy (high administrative offi cials) are in good standing to discourage what Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) regard as temptation for corruption. Th e Consolidated Public Service Salary Structure (CONPSS), that is, the structure for the career core civil service, constitutional bodies, National Assembly Staff , Judiciary Staff and some Parastatals, shows that the annual emolument for the lowest employee is NGN226, 800 and the highest paid civil servant is NGN5, 452,136. Th e compression ratio is 1:24, implying that the highest paid civil servant earns twenty four times more than the lowest paid offi cials. In others words, the lowest paid staff earns a mere 4.12 per cent of the salary of the highest paid offi cial. With this scenario, if pay determines ethical behaviour, it is expected that unethical fi nancial practices should be higher among the lower paid offi cials than among political and high administrative public offi cials.
Factors that Enhance Unethical Financial Behaviour in the Nigerian Public Service
Nigeria is undoubtedly ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. She is ranked 136 out of the 175 countries in the 2016 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Th e Nigerian media are daily awash with reported cases of corruption among public offi cials. David Cameron, the previous British Prime Minister, described Nigeria as fantastically corrupt. Indeed by his own estimate, Nigeria and Afghanistan could be the two most corrupt countries in the world (Vanguard, 2016 ). Cameron could not have been speaking from mere imagination as his position as the British Prime Minister, and the negotiation of the two countries about repatriation of stolen funds stashed by Nigerian politicians in British banks should equip him with reasonable information concerning the value of money laundered by Nigerian public offi cials to foreign banks.
Of course, the reality of high level corruption is irrespective of the various eff orts made to prevent it. Th e country would usually be among the fi rst to subscribe to international conventions and treaties about corruption fi ghting and ethics in public administration, or locally initiated programmes in this regard. Any statement in such declaration that is found to be false by any authority or person authorized in that behalf to verify it shall be deemed to be a breach of this Code. Any property or assets acquired by a public offi cer aft er any declaration required under this Constitution and which is not fairly attributable to income, gift or loan approved by this Code shall be deemed to have been acquired in breach of this Code unless the contrary is proved. -Agents and Nominees -A public offi cer who does any act prohibited by this Code through a nominee, trustee or other agent shall be deemed ipso facto to have committed a breach of this Code. Th e 1988 public service reforms encapsulated in the Civil Service Reorganization Decree No 43 of 1988 had long introduced the audit alarm and other preventive ethical principles including whistle-blowing in the public service and new procedures for the processing of funds. Th ere have been frequent administrative reforms since colonial times, making one change or another to ensure eff ective, transparent and accountable public service (Olaopa, 2008 In the drive towards these accountability and transparency measures and anti-corruption reform eff orts, the country in 2003 voluntarily signed the global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as part of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) comprehensive socio-economic reforms. Th e country began the process of legal enactment to back the domiciliation of the initiative, and in 2007, a specifi c law (the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, NEITI) was enacted making Nigeria the fi rst country in the global EITI to support implementation with legislation (NEITI, 2016). Again, the Nigeria National Assembly passed the Freedom of Information Act in 2011 to make public records and information more freely available, provide for public access to public records and information, protect public records and information to the extent consistent with the public interest and the protection of personal privacy, and to protect serving public offi cers from adverse consequences of disclosing certain kinds of offi cial information without authorization and establish procedures for the achievement of those purposes and for related matters. A key objective of the act is to enhance public scrutiny of public sector operations. For instance, Section 2 (3) of the act makes provision for what every governmental institution should publish. Th ese include materials containing information relating to any grant or contract made by or between the institution and another public institution or private organization, a description of the organization and responsibilities of the institution including details of the programmes and functions of each division, branch and department of the institution, and information relating to the receipt or expenditure of public or other funds of the institution.
In spite of the long institutionalisation and legislation of these codes, establishment of multiple corruption fi ghting agencies and other control measures, the rising rate or persistent high level corruption and fraud in the public sector shows that these eff orts have had little impact in the prevention, detection and prosecution of corrupt public offi cials. Contract infl ation is a permanent feature of the Nigerian public sector. Ownership of foreign bank accounts is common among offi cials. Th e on-going investigation of some of the high profi le offi cials in the former President Goodluck Jonathan's administration reveals the rot in high political offi ces.
Yet ethical codes are legislated, and the fi ght against corruption is always claimed by every successive government. Th e administration of President Obasanjo (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) and that the current president, Buhari have had the disposition to probe some of the activities of past governments. Former President Obasanjo's administration had probed the late General Sani Abacha's regime, while President Buhari is currently investigating some activities of former President Goodluck Jonathan's administration. However, to limit the probe of past governments to only these two bespeaks of vindictiveness and vengeance, which supports the view that the anti-corruption fi ght is merely political and only directed against enemies and opponents. Th is is because there were clear issues of highly corrupt practices that took place in other administrations such as that of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (1985 to 1993), General Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998 to 1999) and former President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999 to 2007) that are not being called to question. For instance, Nigerians had, since the Gulf War of 1991, asked questions about the oil windfall of USD12.4 billion that was not accounted for during General Babangida's administration (Oladimeji, 2016a) . During the former President Obasanjo's administration, Nigeria's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) reached an all-time high (152 of 159) in 2005 (Transparency International, 2016). It was during his administration that the popular exchange of money through 'Ghana must go' (a common fi bre-made sack) bags to get the wishes of the President including the infamous third term bid rubber-stamped by the legislature was rife. It was the era of election and campaign fi nancing through the budgets allocated to certain Ministries like the Ministry of Works. It is therefore justifi ed when fi ghting corruption is perceived as either sectional or selective of acclaimed political enemies rather than any genuine political will to deal with the monster.
High profi le corruption in Nigeria is strongly infl uenced by the nature and ineff ectiveness of the country's political and administrative control measures and the criminal justice system. Th ere is indeed a poor connection between the reports of internal and external audits of public organizations with the activities of anti-corruption agencies. Th us, the agencies oft en have to rely on petitions and whistle-blowing. While this is helpful, there is also the need for offi cial linkage to ensure eff ective monitoring and investigation of infractions through the internal and external audit reports of organizations. Again, the criminal justice system in the country has been found to be a signifi cant draw-back in the fi ght against corruption, even by high standing political offi cials themselves (Lagos State Government, 2017; Channels Television, 2017). Delays in the administration of Justice, light punishment for off enders, corruption in the judiciary and outdated court administration procedures that pay much attention to court processes rather than the substance of cases are all issues in this direction.
As a matter of fact, many high profi le corruption cases being prosecuted by the anti-corruption agencies have been stalled by mere legal procedures, injunctions and interlocutory appeals. In 2015, the ICPC chairman, Ekpo Nta, remarked that over 400 corruption-related cases were being prosecuted by the agency and blamed the judiciary for the draw-backs experienced in the prosecution. In the face of the legal frustrations arising from the poor judicial administrative system such as unrestricted preliminary objections, trial within trial; interlocutory appeals that oft en reach the Supreme Court before re-commencing at the lower court depending on the outcome, re-assigning of trial judges, abuse of court process, illness of defendants, absconding of accused persons, fi ling of fresh charges, and jumping of court bail among others, the anti-graft agencies oft en resort to plea bargaining deals to settled corruption cases. A plea bargain is "a negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant [who] pleads guilty to lesser off ence or to one or more multiple charges in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, usually a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of the other charges" (Garner, 2004 (Garner, , p. 1189 . Oft en the anti-corruption agencies do not have suffi cient funds to prosecute these cases while the accused usually deploy their enormous stolen fi nancial resources to truncate the course of justice.
Th e ICPC boss revealed that over 90 per cent of the agency's budget is used for prosecution instead of the ideal situation where at least 60 percent should be used on prevention strategies (Daniel & Umoru, 2015) . In the face of such constraints, the anti-graft agencies have had to strike a plea bargain with corrupt individuals to return part of their loot for their release. Some typical cases settled in this manner include: a one-time Chief of Air Staff arraigned with 10 others by EFCC on 26 count charges bordering on conspiracy, stealing, fraud and money laundering of a total of NGN22.8 billion ( (Oladimeji, 2016b) . Invariably, once an accused public offi cial feels he could return part of his loot to be free from punishment, he negotiated that option, otherwise spanners were eff ortlessly thrown into the works of the prosecution to delay or evade justice. Criminal cases bordering on huge fi nancial crimes by public offi cials that should receive maximum punishment to discourage potential off enders have been reduced to civil cases that could be settled out of court through plea bargain, while allowing looters to seek and occupy other political positions shamelessly.
While we allow the legal experts to debate the usefulness of the plea bargain, it is not diffi cult to see that the system does not support a strict sanction or disciplinary approach to administrative ethics and will not likely prevent unethical behaviour since potential looters are given a benign option in corruption cases. Similarly, the judicial system that makes it diffi cult to convict off enders or mete out light punishment for weighty off ences does not support an eff ective control and preventive approach. Th e failure of the Nigerian criminal justice system to effectively and severely punish the erring rich and mighty is infamous (Oladimeji, 2016b) , and therefore does not show much political commitment to deal with unethical practices among the high public offi cials. A major incentive to corruption in Nigeria is the sacred cow treatment given to the high profi le looters of public funds.
Even in the present administration (of President Buhari) that claims that the fi ght against corruption is a priority, most Nigerians are not impressed with the way allegations against some members of the cabinet are being handled. For instance, the Nigerian Senate called for the removal and prosecution of the Secretary to the Federal Government (SGF), Babachir Lawal, who was alleged to have breached the country's contract award law. His company, Global Vision Ltd., was one of the companies indicted for allegedly benefi ting from infl ated and phantom contracts -or ones not executed at all. Th e contracts were awarded by the Presidential Initiative on the North East (Adebayo & Tukur, 2016) . Similarly, the appointment of the present Chairman of EFCC was not confi rmed by the Senate based on an unfavourable report regarding sound ethical status by the Department of State Services (DSS), (Umoru & Erunke, 2016) . President Buhari had written back to the Senate alleging an unfair hearing and procedural error in the Senate report. While it is not fair that an individual should be punished for an off ence he or she has not committed, it is more supportive of transparency and public trust in a government that suspected or accused individuals should resign or be relieved of their public offi ce until they prove themselves otherwise. Th is is more crucial in a system where corruption has become a way of life and the public trust in the commitment of political leaders to deal with it is wavering.
Despite the fact that the country has emphasized the legislative approach by legislating every relevant ethical code, she has not shown a strong sanction approach in dealing with her ethical challenge. Th us, the multiple laws against unethical fi nancial practices fail to serve the purpose securing compliance. Th is is because political and administrative controls are loose and the reality is that the country treats unethical behaviour with kid gloves, especially among the high political offi cials. Eff ective political and administrative control should support corruption prevention eff orts by monitoring the management of public resources, detecting and signaling individual defi ciencies and systemic weaknesses (OECD, 2000) . As it is, the anti-graft war in Nigeria is rather reactive and cosmetic than preventive and sanction driven.
Concluding Remarks
Being consistently ranked by Transparency International among the most corrupt nations in the world, it is clear that the Nigerian ethical climate is very conducive to corruption. It therefore requires more of the compliance-based ethical system. Th e compliance-based approach is more appropriate to situations in which unethical behaviour is rampant and will be diffi cult to change, while the integrity-based approach appears more appropriate to situations in which there is a strong shared sense of values, and a higher degree of homogeneity (UNDP, 2007). Apparently, Nigeria gives the impression of using the disciplinary or sanctions approach. While eff orts are made to establish laws criminalizing direct and indirect actions that lead to corruption, and sign international conventions to fi ght corrupt practices, the study shows that the criminal justice system treats corruption with kid gloves and provides support for high public offi cials to be senselessly corrupt rather than work to prevent it. Special attention has not been paid to offi cials in positions that are particularly susceptible to corruption. Creating a disciplinary ethical climate cannot be complete without strong enforcement and consequential outcomes that are suffi cient to discourage potential off enders.
Th us, as far as the punishment for corrupt conducts is light and ample loopholes exist for suspects to manipulate the judicial system, citizens will continue to be attracted to government positions to get rich and indeed, as is usually the case, one will be considered foolish and stupid by his people to remain poor aft er holding an exalted public offi ce. In this kind of ethical environment, it is obvious that the political will and even the psychological disposition of offi cials to do what is universally acceptable or to rely more on the value approach to do what is right may not produce signifi cant results. Th is is the reason why better pay for the higher political and career offi cials has not been signifi cant in reducing unethical conduct among them. Th e divergence in the level of corruption observed among the high profi le public offi cials and the low ones lies in the eff ectiveness of political and administrative control measures. Th e low level employees are subjected to a series of administrative controls exercised by the hierarchy of their institutions; but the high level political and administrative offi cials have little control resulting from lack of transparency and openness in government, weak civil society actions and ineff ective political leadership and will.
Subjecting politicians and high level career administrators to greater societal pressures through more open and transparent measures including the use of open bidding approaches for government contracts, exploiting and strengthening the whistle-blowing policy recently introduced by the Federal Ministry of Finance, could help to strengthen the control system. Th ere is also need to consider enacting a law that could establish a separate system of courts to handle corruption cases, recognize lifelines in handling and dispensing the cases and signifi cantly reviewing the punishments, including death sentences for corrupt acts involving some benchmark monetary value. It is perhaps thanks to the severity of punishment and a very strict attitude towards corruption and the Chinese criminal justice system that that country and many others in Asia as well have been doing a very good job in preventing and punishing corruption (Yunhai, 2005) .
